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Highlights 
• Arctic holds large deposits of offshore petroleum resources. 
• Access to such resources is determined by many factors including States’ 
licensing regimes. 
• Such regimes can be characterised on a spectrum from ‘stringent’ to ‘lenient’. 
• The licensing regime is found to be insignificant for the level of industry 
interest in the Arctic. 
• Other factors such as environmental laws, location, and infrastructure might 
play a bigger role. 
 
Abstract 
Despite the expectation of potentially vast petroleum resources in the offshore Arctic over the last 
decade, actual exploration and production rates are rather low. As of today, there are only two 
producing oil fields and one natural gas field in production. While technical challenges and a low oil 
price are among the explaining factors, the legal regimes for awarding licenses in Arctic waters may 
have a significant impact on industry interest as well. Offshore licensing regimes in Arctic countries 
range from State-centric in Russia to market-based in the United States. Further, some States 
developed additional requirements for companies wishing to operate in the Arctic waters. This paper 
examines the interconnections between the legal regimes for offshore licenses and the rates of industry 
activity in petroleum development in Arctic waters. It does so by devising an analytical comparative 
framework for the licensing regimes across five Arctic States. The results are then analysed in the 
context of actual exploration and production rates in Arctic waters. The analysis sheds light on the role 
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of licensing regimes on the level of industry interest and corresponding exploration and production 
rates. 
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1. Introduction 
Arctic petroleum2 resources are an important issue on the Arctic discussion agenda 
ever since the receding sea ice has sparked hopes and fears about accessing thus far 
undiscovered resources in Arctic offshore areas (see eg [1-3, 93]). The expectation of 
potentially vast resources in the Arctic, however, did not lead to a wide industry 
uptake of offshore petroleum exploration and production activities. To date, there are 
three producing petroleum fields in Arctic waters: one in Russia and two in Norway. 
Commentators have explored a number of factors that could explain the lack of 
industry interest [26, 27]. The low oil price since late 2014 has indeed led many 
companies to announce and forecast slowed or even halted exploration and production 
activities [4]. However, the oil price is all but one factor in determining the pace and 
extent of petroleum exploration and production. There is a number of factors 
significantly affecting industry interest and the pace of exploration and production. 
Among the most influential are geography, geology, environmental regulations, 
political climate, availability of infrastructure, and past history of petroleum 
development in different parts of the Arctic. These have been explored by scholars [5, 
28-30, 89], but are constantly evolving and warrant further research. A crucial and 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper the word ‘petroleum’ is used as a collective term for hydrocarbons and includes 
both oil and gas, in line with the definition of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate accessible at 
<http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/Information-services/Dictionary/>. 
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thus far overlooked aspect is the nature of the licensing regimes in different countries 
and how they might affect the level of petroleum activities. This paper builds on 
existing research in energy law and policy [118-120] to examine the interconnections 
between upstream petroleum regulation, State policies, and offshore exploration and 
production activities in Arctic States. Scholars have examined in-depth both the legal 
character of petroleum licenses [13, 41] and licensing regimes in various States [41; 
12]. The analysis of licensing regimes in the Arctic, however, has been presented in a 
rather fragmented manner in scholarly work. The licensing regimes of separate Arctic 
States are considered in volumes edited by Hunter [12] and Daintith [41]. Other 
authors look at licensing in passing when considering offshore legal regime more 
generally. Pelaudeix compares legal regimes for offshore drilling across Canada, 
Greenland, and Norway, considering the financial liability for oil spills, taxation, 
environmental assessment, and public consultation requirements. She further analyses 
the reasons behind the adopted legal regimes, which she sees in the value of resources 
to each State as reflected in their energy policies [28]. Bankes conducted a 
comparative analysis of the legal frameworks for offshore petroleum development in 
Canada, Norway, Russia, and the US with a brief discussion on the award of licenses 
and associated requirements [29]. A detailed overview of offshore development in the 
Arctic, including licenses, is presented by Henderson and Loe [30].  
Despite the breadth of literature on the subject, there is a lack of a comprehensive up-
to-date comparative study on the licensing regimes across all five Arctic coastal 
States. Further, no previous study attempted to test the relationship between the 
licensing regimes and the level of industry activity in the Arctic. 
Another telling puzzle is that over the years we can observe very different responses 
to licensing rounds issued by Arctic states. While in some rounds, especially in 
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Norway, we observe a high response rate from energy companies, other regions have 
seen very few or even no bids coming in response to licensing rounds [6] or even their 
outright cancellation [7]. 
This article thus analyses the licensing regimes of the five Arctic coastal states in 
relation to their Arctic offshore petroleum resources, ie including Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the US, as a possible additional factor influencing 
the pace and extent of Arctic petroleum activities. The core research question of the 
article is: Is there a connection between the level of offshore petroleum activities in 
the respective States and the licensing regime? The according hypothesis is: A stricter 
licensing regime means less petroleum activity in offshore Arctic areas, while a more 
lenient licensing regime means more activity. 
After an overview of petroleum licensing regimes (section 2), the analytical 
framework outlines the relevant factors for characterising a licensing regime as strict 
or lenient (section 3). The following country analysis (section 4) presents the 
licensing regimes of the five Arctic coastal states analysed in this paper. These 
findings are then juxtaposed with an overview of the level of petroleum activity in the 
five Arctic states since the 1960s with a particular focus on post-2008 activities3, 
allowing the testing of the hypothesis if countries with relatively lenient license 
regimes show high petroleum exploration and production activity and countries with 
stricter regimes show less activity (section 5). Section 6 concludes and suggests other 
factors for explaining levels of petroleum activity. 
                                                 
3 During the 1950s and 60s the first large Arctic oil and gas fields have been discovered in Russia, 
Alaska, and Canada [9, p. 14-16]. In 2008, the US Geological Survey published a report that estimates 
that up to 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas may be located in the Arctic [78].  
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2. Overview: Petroleum licensing regimes 
The right of States to grant licenses for the exploration and production of petroleum 
resources to companies stems from the notion of State sovereignty over their natural 
resources [10]. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea confirms the sovereign 
rights of States ‘for the purpose of exploring […] and exploiting […] natural 
resources’ within their Exclusive Economic Zones and on their continental shelves 
[11, art. 56, 77, Part VI]. Petroleum regulatory systems can be divided into 
contractual, and licensing and concession systems [12, p. 37]. Contractual systems 
include risk service and petroleum sharing contracts and are used almost exclusively 
in developing and emerging nations [12, p. 37-40] (but see section 4.4 on the use of 
Production Sharing Agreements in Russia). 
Licensing is  
the identification by government of potential (upstream) petroleum investment opportunities 
in the national territory, their subdivision into discrete contract areas of prospective size, their 
offering to international oil companies by a suitable tendering process and the establishment 
and negotiation of technical, financial and contractual terms and conditions (for award) 
consistent with their petroleum prospectivity and with the national interest [13, p. xxii]. 
The legal nature of petroleum licenses is not definite and regulatory frameworks for 
awarding petroleum licenses have undergone considerable changes representing 
shifting priorities of States holding oil and gas resources [28]. While some highlight 
the elements of the contractual character of licenses, others emphasize their regulatory 
features [14-16]. Indeed, like other activities subject to licensing (eg driving or gun 
ownership), petroleum exploration and development is potentially hazardous and 
might interfere with other important maritime activities, such as navigation or 
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fisheries. Licenses do not merely give permission to conduct exploration or 
production but also set out conditions and rules. Licensing further contributes to State 
revenue collection; however, for oil and gas activities the licensing itself is a less 
important income generator than the tax on the production and the resulting profits 
[16, p. 54; 17]. 
The national authority responsible for license awards varies among States. In some, 
there is a designated agency responsible for awarding petroleum licenses (eg 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in Norway), while in others this is done through the 
ministry of natural resources or other ministries (eg Ministry of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development in Canada). Since the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the 
functions of awarding petroleum licenses, revenue collection, and overseeing the 
enforcement of health and safety regulations are increasingly performed by separate 
agencies to ensure the independence and avoid conflict of interests. In federal States, 
the federation units often retain authority to oversee offshore petroleum licensing 
regimes, while in some this may be restricted to certain offshore areas (eg in the US).  
The award of licenses is usually done in four steps: 
1) Identification of areas and division into blocks 
The identification of areas to be opened for petroleum activities is usually done by 
States. The areas are then divided into smaller blocks, which are offered to 
companies. Licensing blocks vary in size and are nominated either by companies or 
by the State itself [20, sec. 3-1; 21, sec. 14-2]. 
2) Announcement of licensing round 
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Licensing rounds, as a rule, are announced publicly, specifying the areas and criteria 
for applicants’ selection. Licensing rounds can be held on a regular or on an ad hoc 
basis [15, p. 78]. 
3)  Evaluation of applications 
There are two main ways of selecting applicants: by bid (auction) and discretionary 
[12, p. 46; 22]. Under the bidding method, the licenses are awarded through auctions 
to the highest bidder. The bids can be in form of cash or a work programme in which 
case the license ‘is awarded to the applicant that bids to spend the highest amount of 
work, in dollar terms, on exploration for petroleum’ [12, p. 46] in the defined area. 
Bidding is an efficient way to avoid corruption through a transparent and open 
process and maximise State profits. However, where the geological properties of the 
area offered are not fully known, the interest from prospective licensees might be low 
resulting in only few or no bids at all. The discretionary method allows the competent 
authorities to select the licensees based on criteria they develop, such as technical 
competence and financial capacity [23, sec. 10]. In some States, licenses may be 
awarded exclusively to national oil companies (see section 4.4). In contrast, other 
jurisdictions, eg those subject to European Union law, require equal treatment of 
national and foreign companies. 
4) Award of licenses 
Licenses for offshore petroleum activities are usually divided into exploration (EL) 
and production (PL) licenses. In some jurisdictions, other types of licenses are 
introduced to maximise recovery from a petroleum province, encourage industry to 
exploit resources in new, un(der)explored areas, or incentivise production in locations 
with challenging conditions [24]. Exploration and production licenses are awarded for 
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a defined amount of time, usually with the possibility for extension subject to the 
approval of the respective authority. 
Licenses outline duties and rights of licensees. They further specify conditions under 
which licenses may be revoked. Whereas the licensing conditions are generally the 
same for all offshore areas of a State [25], some features of the licensing framework 
may have different implications for petroleum development in Arctic waters.  
 
3. Analytical framework 
As licensing regimes are part of national legislation, there are crucial differences but 
also striking similarities between Arctic States’ approaches to licensing [25].  To 
determine whether the level of industry interest in offshore Arctic petroleum depends 
on the type of licensing regime, this paper relies on the hypotheses that there are 
features of a licensing regime that petroleum companies, ie the applicants for 
petroleum licenses, might generally favour and others which they might interpret as 
more restricting for the achievement of their goals. Based on the information about 
licensing regimes as outlined in section 2, this enables us to establish indicators for 
‘strict’ and ‘lenient’ licensing regimes from the perspective of the petroleum industry, 
which in turn – according to our hypothesis – could be an indicator for the likelihood 
and extent of petroleum activities in the offshore Arctic. 
A first indicator is the specific award method. Generally, the bidding method can be 
interpreted as a preferable license method for companies in contrast to the 
discretionary model since the open and transparent auction procedure provides them 
with more leeway and influence on the outcome of the licensing process. Further, a 
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more complex award method requires many pre-qualifications or eligibility 
requirements for those companies, which can obtain licenses. 
A further indicator is related to the number of authorities involved in the licensing 
process, with several levels (eg at federal and state level) and institutions engaged in 
the licensing process indicating a more complicated licensing regime for companies. 
An indicator for a lenient licensing regime is the possibility for companies to 
nominate blocks themselves as this provides them with an opportunity to directly 
influence the content of the license on offer. Further, companies are likely to prefer 
frequent and regular license rounds since this provides them with opportunities to get 
engaged in more offshore projects and in planning their production and revenue base 
for the future. Companies also favour calls for license applications on demand, since 
this gives them the possibility to influence the timing of licensing issuance.  
Finally, companies favour long duration times of licenses, which gives them more 
planning leeway in the offshore petroleum sector, which is usually plagued with large 
uncertainties as to the amount and quality of resources that can actually be developed. 
In the Arctic, this is especially relevant due to very short ice-free drilling seasons and 
the possibility of facing litigation from environmental groups. Accordingly, 
companies also favour the possibility to extend and adjust licenses and thus to 
postpone investment and development requirements. Related to this, companies 
favour only a few conditions set by States in order to be able to achieve the retention 
of an expiring license. 
A number of requirements linked to the issuing of a license induce more costs on the 
side of petroleum companies, such as various kinds of fees. Some States also impose 
a duty to conduct obligatory works on the license holders, such as to conduct a certain 
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coverage of seismic studies, local content, or drilling of a certain number of wells by a 
certain date. Finally, companies prefer to be granted so-called exclusive licences, 
which give them the exclusive right to exercise the rights conferred in the license, 
while non-exclusive licenses also allow other parties to be active in the respective 
area. 
 
 
Table 1: Indicators for “strict” and “lenient” licensing regime 
Indicator Strict Lenient 
Award method  Discretionary Bidding/Auction 
Prequalification/Eligibility 
requirements 
Many and/or difficult to meet Minimal to none  
Authorities involved Several institutional scales 
involved, many authorities 
One institutional scale involved, 
one or few authorities 
Nomination of blocks by 
companies 
Not possible Possible 
Frequency of issuance and 
regularity 
Seldom, irregular/ad hoc Often, regular, on demand 
Duration, extension, adjustment Shorter duration, strict 
requirements for extension, 
adjustment not possible 
Longer duration, easy to extend, 
adjustment possible 
Fees Apply Do not apply 
Duties under the license Obligatory works No obligatory works 
Exclusivity of licenses Non-exclusive Exclusive 
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4. Country analysis 
4.1 Canada 
The management of Canadian Arctic offshore oil and gas resources is mainly 
exercised under federal statutes and regulations: the Canada Petroleum Resources Act 
(CPRA) [33] regulates the allocation of rights for resources and collection of 
royalties. 
Canada adopts the bidding method for awarding Exploration Licenses [35]. The 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development announces calls for bids 
and issues Exploration, Significant Discovery, and Production Licenses [33, sec. 
13(1), 14]. The calls for bids take into account requests by the industry and remain 
open for at least 120 days [33, sec. 14]. Canadian legislation does not set any pre-
qualification requirements for bidders. 
In 2016, then-US President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau issued a 
joint statement calling for a moratorium on new licenses for the Arctic offshore [8]. 
The Canadian authorities are implementing the moratorium and no call for bids was 
announced in 2016 or 2017 in Canadian Arctic waters. The moratorium in Canada is 
to be ‘tested every five years by a science-based, life-cycle assessment, taking into 
account marine and climate change science’ [45]. President Trump overturned the ban 
in April 2017 [92]. 
There are three types of licenses: EL, PL, and Significant Discovery License (SDL). 
An EL is granted for a nine-year term [33, sec. 26(2), 27(1)-(3)]. The SDL, a special 
feature of the Canadian petroleum regime, allows the operator to not engage in 
production activities immediately after the discovery of a significant petroleum 
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deposit but to hold on to the exclusive rights to apply for a PL in the future. The 
Minister reserves a right to request that the license holder drills a well in any SDL 
area [33, sec. 33]. There can be conditions precluding such immediate production 
such as low oil or gas prices, infrastructure investment, or lack of technology. In the 
Arctic, these difficulties are especially pronounced. A SDL grants rights identical to 
those under the EL and is valid for an indefinite term as long as the Declaration of 
Significant Discovery issued by the NEB remains in force [33, sec. 29, 32(3)]. PLs 
are granted by the NEB and are valid for 25 years [33, sec. 35, 38, 41(1)]. 
ELs are non-renewable and non-extendable unless the drilling has commenced and 
has not been completed before the expiration date or if the EL is on ‘frontier lands’, 
including Canada’s continental shelf [33, sec. 26(2, 5), 27(1-3)]. PLs can be extended 
if ‘on the expiration of the term of a production licence, petroleum is being produced 
commercially’ [33, sec. 41(3)]. 
License holders are obliged to pay forfeitures (successful bidders are required to post 
25% of the work proposal bid as security against the performance of work), 
refundable and non-refundable rentals, and fees [45]. The amount is decided by the 
Minister pursuant to sec. 24(1) of the CPRA. The work deposit is refundable against 
expenditures. Rental payments have been on the decline in the past five years, with 
53,195 CAD profit for the government in 2012 and under a 1,000 CAD in 2015 and 
2016 [45]. In 2016, the revenue from issuance fees and fees for service was 2,708 
CAD [45].  
An EL grants the non-exclusive right to explore for petroleum and exclusive rights to 
drill and to obtain a PL [33, sec. 22]. A PL confers upon the licensee exclusive rights 
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to drill for and produce petroleum and the title to such produced petroleum [33, sec. 
37]. 
Despite the current moratorium on new licenses in the Canadian Arctic waters, the 
long-term policy outlook prioritises the exercise of sovereignty and promotion of 
Northern economic development, and petroleum exploration and production activities 
have been identified as appropriate means to achieve this goal.  
 
4.2 Greenland (Denmark) 
Following the adoption of the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, the powers to 
administer rights over offshore petroleum resources in Greenland were devolved to 
Nuuk. For Greenland, extracting natural resources is a substantial part of its strive 
towards even further independence from Denmark [46]. The management of 
petroleum development is regulated by the Greenland Mineral Resources Act 
(GMRA) [47]. 
Under the auspices of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Mineral Licence and 
Safety Authority is responsible both for issuing licenses and safety matters. 
Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy indicates that the goal of the country’s licence 
strategy for oil and gas is to ‘cultivate and maintain industry interest in oil exploration 
activities in Greenland’ [48, p. 9]. 
The Greenland Government uses a discretionary method to award licenses based on 
the applicants’ previous experience, financial background, work programme, and 
safety systems [47, sec. 24]. The GMRA requires that only limited liability companies 
with a registered office in Greenland and appropriate loan capital may obtain a license 
[47, sec. 16]. 
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Licenses are awarded through licensing rounds, while allowing companies to make 
applications outside these rounds (eg where the application is made for an area 
neighbouring an existing license) [47, sec. 23]. The latest round was held in 
December 2017 and no bids were received. The Government attributed the absence of 
interest to the ‘global recession within the exploration industry’ [49]. 
The following types of licenses can be granted: Prospecting, Exploration, and 
Exploitation license. The Prospecting license is issued for up to five years; 
Exploration and Exploitation Licenses are granted for up to ten years or, if special 
circumstances exist, for up to 16 years [47, sec. 15, 22]. Where commercially 
exploitable deposits are discovered, the license may be extended with production 
rights for 30 years [47, sec. 22]. An Exploration and Exploitation License may be 
extended with a view to exploration by up to three years at a time. Any further 
extensions remain at the discretion of the Government but the total period cannot 
exceed 50 years [47, sec. 16, 22, 25]. The Exploration and Exploitation licenses are 
exclusive while Prospecting licenses are not [47, sec. 15, 16]. 
For the Prospecting license, the fee payable on the granting of the license is adjusted 
annually. As of 1 January 2017, it amounted to the equivalent of 3,921 USD [52]. For 
the Exploration and Exploitation License, GMRA required a fee for granting a license 
and an area fee [47, sec. 16, 17]. The model license for 2017 indicated a license fee 
equivalent of 34,024 USD [53, 54]. The same amount is payable on each extension of 
the license. Although the GMRA states that the area fee is calculated on the basis of 
the size of the area covered by the license, the model license indicates the amount 
equivalent of 162,050 USD ‘regardless of the size of the area’. The costs are higher 
compared to other States, but exemptions may be granted at the discretion of the 
Government [47, sec. 17]. 
15 
 
Under an Exploration license, work commitments can be established and the area of 
the license can be reduced in accordance with the fulfilment of such commitments 
[47, sec. 16]. Further, the license might require the use of local labour and services 
unless such labour is not available or companies are not commercially or technically 
competitive [47, sec. 18]. 
Despite the lack of interest in the latest licensing round, the Greenlandic resource 
development policy indicates interest to open new areas in an effort to attract private 
investment in oil exploration [48]. The licensing framework appears to be 
straightforward and lenient, which supports the Government’s resource development 
ambitions. The lack of industry interest may be attributed to other factors, such as the 
failures in previous exploration activities [50], remote location, and scarce 
infrastructure [51]. 
 
4.3 Norway 
The oil and gas industry is ‘the largest contributor to the Norwegian economy’ [55, p. 
20] and Arctic waters are increasingly in the focus for exploration given the maturing 
of fields in the Norwegian and North Seas. The government expects that 43% of the 
undiscovered oil and gas resources on the Norwegian continental shelf are located in 
the Barents Sea [55, p. 6-7].   
The main legal basis for oil and gas development in Norway is the Petroleum Act [20] 
supplemented by the Petroleum Regulations [23]. It outlines the conditions of 
granting licenses, production of petroleum, liability for pollution damage, safety 
requirements, and the management of the State’s participation in petroleum activities.  
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In Norway, licenses are awarded at discretion based on ‘factual and objective criteria’ 
[23, sec. 4-5] including technical competence, financial capacity, the applicant’s 
exploration and production plan, and previous experience [23, sec. 10]. The 
Norwegian system assigns licenses to groups of companies [59, p. 368; 60]. Each 
participant gets a license share and is required to enter into a joint operating 
agreement (JOA) [61]. The State participates in such joint ventures through Statoil, in 
which the Norwegian State retains 67% of the shares [62, p. 110-111], and Petoro, 
which is wholly owned by the State [20, sec. 3-6; 23, sec. 12, 64]. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is responsible for the Norwegian 
petroleum sector as a whole. Subordinate to it, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
inter alia exercises authority over petroleum development, issues relevant regulations, 
and collects fees from the petroleum industry.  
An annual system of so-called ‘Awards in Predefined Areas (APA)’ was established 
in 2003, covering mature parts of the Norwegian continental shelf [65], which today 
constitute almost the entire North Sea and some areas in the Norwegian and Barents 
Seas [66]. So-called ‘frontier areas’ – large areas of the Barents Sea that are less 
explored and with fewer infrastructure in place [66] – are subject to ordinary 
concession rounds. These have been held since 1965 and in recent years usually every 
second year. The rules under the APA and the frontier areas system differ 
predominantly in the stages before licensing rounds are announced. For example, 
companies can nominate a limited number of blocks to be included in new frontier 
areas licensing rounds but not for mature blocks [71; 66]. Final decisions on whether 
to open new areas for licensing lie with the Norwegian Parliament [20 sec. 3; 23 sec. 
6d]. 
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After an area is open, the MPE may grant an EL ‘for a period of three calendar years 
unless another period of time is stipulated’ [20, sec. 2-1]. A PL is granted for up to ten 
years [20, sec. 3-9]. In case a company has fulfilled the work obligation in relation to 
the area covered by the PL, it may apply for an extension for up to 50 years, or even 
further under certain circumstances [20, sec. 3-9]. On the other hand, the MPE may 
also decide that exploration drilling or development of a deposit shall be postponed or 
even that the license shall be revoked [see eg 20, sec. 4-5, 3-13]. Within the 
timeframe of the PL and with a three months’ notice, the licensee may relinquish parts 
of the area covered by the production license or even surrender the PL in its entirety 
[20, sec. 3-14, 3-15]. 
Licensees must pay a fee for filing an application for a license [23, sec. 9]; in 2017 the 
fee was set at 123,000 NOK [67]. For an EL, companies have to pay 65,000 NOK per 
year and for every seismic survey planned a fee of 33,000 NOK is charged [23, sec. 5, 
9]. For a PL, companies pay an annual ‘area fee’, which is calculated per square 
kilometre of the area covered [66; 72]. However, companies may apply for 
exemptions, eg if the area is actively explored, production is taking place, or a 
company is following the mandatory work programme [66; 73]. 
Work obligations may be imposed such as ‘exploration and exploration drilling of a 
certain number of wells down to specified depths or geological formations’, to be 
specified for each individual PL [20, sec. 3-8].   
An EL grants the licensee the non-exclusive right to explore for petroleum and does 
not provide any preferential right for a PL [20, sec. 2-1]. A PL entails an exclusive 
right to exploration, exploration drilling, and production of petroleum in the license 
area [20, sec. 3-3, 3-9].  
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4.4. Russia 
Upstream petroleum regulation in the Russian offshore area is heavily controlled by 
the State [74; 34]. The main legislative basis for rights management in offshore 
petroleum is the Subsoil Law [74]. It establishes the conditions for granting, 
transferring, and terminating licenses; State oversight; and payable fees [74, art. 6, 
12]. 
Sites on the continental shelf are subject to exclusive federal regulation [74, art. 2.1]. 
While Russian petroleum legislation gives preference to the auction method [74, art. 
10, 13.1], the licenses for developing offshore Arctic resources are awarded using the 
discretionary method [74, art. 10.1(1); 75, art. 7; 79]. For the Arctic offshore, there 
are no licensing rounds as such, and issuances of licenses are made at the discretion of 
the Government. The (few) qualified companies that can operate in the Arctic 
offshore can apply for licenses in particular areas [79]. 
The State governs offshore petroleum production through the Ministry of Energy 
(Minenergo), which administers the energy sector as a whole; and the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Ecology (Minprirody), which oversees the licensing regime for 
petroleum production through the Federal Agency on Subsoil Use (Rosnedra) [80]. 
Rosnedra is responsible for the issuance and registration of licenses and the 
establishment of regular payment rates for the use of the block [80, art. 5.3.8, 5.3.12, 
5.3.2]. 
Since 2009, Russian law imposes restrictions on awarding licenses for development 
on the continental shelf limiting foreign companies’ participation in upstream 
activities. The Subsoil Law requires that license holders on continental shelf blocks 
are legal entities with an experience of operating on the Russian continental shelf of at 
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least five years, and with a share owned by the Russian State of no less than 50% [74, 
art. 9]. Thus, the only companies eligible to hold licenses in the Russian Arctic 
offshore are Gazprom and Rosneft’ and their subsidiaries. The five-year experience 
requirement also precludes special purpose companies incorporated by foreign 
companies in partnership with Gazprom and Rosneft’, as the newly formed company 
will not have the experience. The law does not explain whether the mother-
companies’ experience would count. Russian experts conclude that it would not [82, 
p. 43]. Such special purpose companies created with foreign partners can operate the 
field but not hold the license. This model has been used in the Russian Arctic by Eni 
and ExxonMobil to partner with Rosneft’ for exploration operations in the Barents 
and Kara Seas [83].  
Another form of foreign companies’ participation in the Russian Arctic offshore 
development is through a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) [85]. The PSA is 
different from the Norwegian JOA in that the State is a necessary party to the 
agreement [85, art. 3.1]. Investors carry all the risks, cover all the expenses, and get a 
share of the produced petroleum in return [85, art. 2.1, 8]. PSAs are currently not 
widely used by companies [81, p. 320]; all three of the existing PSAs were concluded 
prior to the adoption of the PSA Law (Sakhalin- I, Sakhalin –II, and Kharyaga. [86, p. 
157]). 
Russian law distinguishes between Exploration, Production, and Combined Licenses 
[84, art. 6], the latter including several types of subsoil use (eg exploration and 
production) [84, art. 6]. ELs on the continental shelf are awarded for up to ten years 
[74, art. 10]. PLs are awarded for as long as defined in the feasibility study for the 
development of minerals [74, art. 10]. 
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The Subsoil Law regulates fees and payments, including one-off payments (eg for 
changing the boundaries of the license area) and regular payments [87, 74, art. 39]. 
The regular payments are collected for activities such as geological prospecting and 
construction of certain structures [74, art. 43]. Their size depends on the geographical 
and economic conditions, size of the license area, type of the resource, risk, and other 
factors [88]. The subsidies provided by the Russian State to petroleum development in 
Arctic waters are significant and include government investment in exploration, 
infrastructure development, and tax breaks [89, p. 1]. 
Licenses can contain information on the agreed volume of produced petroleum [74, 
art. 12]. Further, the license holder has a number of standard obligations, such as 
adhering to the environmental and safety legislation [74, art. 22]. Any resource 
development activities within the license area are reserved exclusively for the license 
holder. However, if activities are restricted to non-invasive prospecting, the 
Government may grant permissions for such activities to more than one company [74, 
art. 7]. 
In September 2016, the Russian Government announced a temporary moratorium on 
issuing new licenses on the Arctic shelf, citing the macroeconomic instability and the 
significant workload for State companies on the fields already in development [90]. 
The depleting resources onshore push the Russian industry north and offshore to 
maintain its leading position as a petroleum exporter. Yet, the technological expertise 
of Russian companies and the infrastructure in the Russian North are limited. 
Although Russia was the first country to start producing oil in the Arctic offshore in 
2014 (from the Prirazlomnoe field), development has proven to be more costly and 
time-consuming than expected [89]. Although private companies press for the 
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liberalisation of the offshore legal regime so as to grant them access to the continental 
shelf, changes are not expected in the near future [91, p. 5-6].  
 
4.5 US 
According to the 1953 Submerged Lands Act, US states have rights to the natural 
resources of submerged lands from the coastline to no more than three nautical miles 
(§1312). Therefore, federal laws apply on the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 
The licensing regime (referred to as leasing in the US) is regulated by the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) [94; 32], which determines a four-stage 
leasing process: (1) a five-year plan, (2) preleasing activities and lease sale, (3) 
exploration, and (4) development and production [95; 96 p. 5]. While literature offers 
comprehensive accounts of US offshore petroleum regime [31, 32], this section 
focuses exclusive on licensing. 
The US uses a bidding system for lease sales [94, 1337(a)]. There are three main 
authorities involved in regulating activities on the Alaska OCS. The Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management (BOEM) oversees rights management; the Bureau of Safety and 
Environment Enforcement is responsible for health, safety, and environmental 
regulation; and the Office of Natural Resource Revenue manages fees and royalties 
collection. 
Before acceptance of any bid, the OCSLA allows an antitrust review of proposed 
lease sales. If it is found that a proposed lease sale is inconsistent with antitrust law, 
the Secretary of the Interior may refuse to issue the lease or refuse bids for the lease 
[94, 1337(c)]. Further, a company may not submit a bid if it is not meeting due 
diligence requirements on leases it already has [94, 1337(d)]. The Code of Federal 
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Regulations sets qualification requirements for potential lessees concerning 
nationality and company registration in the US [97, 30 CFR 256.35]. 
The actual lease process starts with BOEM publishing a call for information and 
nominations regarding potential lease areas and it ‘may receive and consider 
indications of interest in areas for mineral leasing’ [95; 96, p. 10; 97, 30 CFR 556.23, 
556.25]. State or local government representatives ‘may submit recommendations to 
the Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of a proposed lease sale’ [94, 
1345(a)]. Further, the law hints at the possibility for companies to be involved in the 
nomination of license blocs [94, 1344(a, 2, E)]. 
The Secretary of the Interior schedules and maintains the leasing program, which 
takes into account the national energy needs for a five-year period [94, 1344(a)]. The 
management of the OCS must consider economic, social, and environmental 
conditions and concerns [94, 1344(a)(1)] but scheduling of lease sales is otherwise 
left to the discretion of the Secretary. 
A lease is granted for an initial period of up to five years. This may be extended to ten 
years if ‘necessary to encourage exploration and development’ in areas with adverse 
conditions [94, 1347(b)(2)], which applies to Arctic offshore areas. The production 
period can last indefinitely as long as ‘oil or gas is produced from the area in paying 
quantities’ [94, 1337(b)(2)]. This does not mean that the production must be 
profitable, rather it must ‘exceed only day-to-day costs of well operations’ [104, p. 
167]. Concerning postponements and adjustments, lessees may request an approval of 
suspension for all or parts of a lease. Suspension can either refer to a postponement of 
the requirement to produce (Suspension of Production (SOP)) or of conducting 
leaseholding operations (Suspension of Operations (SOO)) [30 CFR 250.168]. 
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Successful lessees must deliver various up-front and performance payments [94, 
1337(a)(7); 97, 30 CFR 556.52-556.59]. Rental payments and other financial 
commitments are decided on a sale-by-sale basis [103, p. 10-19]. Lessees may have 
work or other commitments, such as ‘prompt and efficient exploration, development, 
and production’ [94, 1334 (a)]. Further, companies must sell 20% of produced 
resources to small or independent refiners [94, 1337(b)(7)]. Finally, lessees have to 
provide for the suspension or cancellation of a lease if certain circumstances occur 
[94, 1337(b)(5), 1334]. According to the OCSLA, an oil and gas lease ‘shall entitle 
the lessee to explore, develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease 
area’ [94, 1337(b)(4)], hinting at the exclusive character of the license.  
 
5. Analysis 
The findings from the analysis of the five Arctic States’ licensing regimes are 
summarised in Table 2. Concerning award method, the US and Canada provide the 
most favourable system for companies, while Greenland, Norway, and Russia use the 
more stringent discretionary model. The US has the highest number of authorities 
involved (three) in the licensing process, which is further complicated by the 
necessity to involve affected US-States. In Greenland, only one government agency is 
engaged, while in Canada, Norway, and Russia the process is administered by two 
authorities. 
All five States apply eligibility requirements for companies to be able to apply for 
licenses, but these are different across States. Canada and the US only require few and 
relatively easy to fulfil pre-qualifications, while in Greenland and Norway the 
eligibility standards are quite demanding. Russia is an obvious outlier; access to 
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license ownership in Russian Arctic waters is restricted to companies with a majority 
State ownership and over five years of operating experience on the Russian 
continental shelf.  
In Canada and Greenland, licensing rounds are held on demand. Norway applies 
regular and frequent licensing rounds, while Russia and the US show less favourable 
criteria. Issuing of licenses in Russia is left to the discretion of the Government, and 
together with the very limiting eligibility criteria for the Arctic offshore make for 
unfavourable conditions for all foreign and many Russian companies. In the US, 
license sales are part of five-year plans, and the State keeps significant discretion as to 
the frequency of lease sales. All States allow (at least de facto) the nomination of 
potential license blocs by companies; only Norway prohibits this for mature blocks. 
The five States provide exploration durations between three and ten years; the 
relatively short three-year period in Norway is not set in stone and other time periods 
may be stipulated. Concerning production/exploitation licenses, all five States appear 
to be flexible on license term extensions as long as drilling operations and/or 
petroleum production is continuing (only Greenland sets a (albeit generous) time limit 
at 50 years). Canada, Greenland, and the US allow requests for extension/suspension 
of licenses, but the US practice has shown that companies may have their request 
denied [101, 102]. Norway, in contrast, only provides the possibility to relinquish 
parts of or an entire PL. The Canadian SDL further allows companies to delay 
production activities once the discovery has been made. 
All States require licensees to pay various kinds of fees. In Greenland and Norway, 
however, basically all fees may be waived under certain circumstances and most of 
the fees and payments in Canada are refundable. Russian law does not prescribe 
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refund of payments, but the final amounts are specified in the license itself. In the US, 
the required up-front and performance payments are substantial and quite a burden to 
companies. Another common practice is the possibility of placing work obligation on 
the licensees with a possibility of early license expiration if the required work 
operations are not conducted. Finally, all five States allow for the suspension or 
cancellation of a license if the licensee violates relevant laws or license terms. Four of 
the five States deem non-invasive exploration licenses as non-exclusive, but as the 
drilling starts, the production licenses grant exclusive rights to the area. Only the US 
provides exclusive rights to explore, develop, and produce oil and gas in a given 
license area. 
The comparative analysis of these findings can be broken down into two steps: access 
to licenses and operation. With regards to access, Canada appears to have the most 
lenient system with a bidding method, few authorities involved, minimal pre-
qualification requirements, possibility for companies to nominate blocs, and licensing 
rounds held on demand. Greenland and Norway share many of these lenient features 
but are put apart by the discretionary award method and stricter eligibility criteria. 
While lenient on award method, pre-qualifications, and nomination by companies, 
heavy US bureaucracy, infrequent license calls, and the heavy influence of 
inconsistent attitudes of political administrations might create difficulties and 
uncertainties for potential license applicants in US Arctic waters. Russia proves the 
strictest in terms of access by using the discretionary method, license calls on 
discretion of the government, and especially by putting in place very restricting 
eligibility criteria. 
In terms of operation, all five States show overall relatively lenient licensing regimes. 
Comparatively, Norway appears to apply the strictest regime because of potentially 
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short durations of ELs, comparatively stricter duties under the license, and non-
exclusive ELs. Russia and the US take a middle position. Russia shows non-waivable 
fee requirements and non-exclusive exploration/prospecting licences. The US requires 
substantial and non-waivable up-front and performance payments as well as extensive 
duties under the license; albeit, the US shows the most favourable situation in terms 
of exclusivity of licences. Canada and Greenland have been found to be the most 
favourable system with a non-exclusive prospecting license the only fly in the 
ointment for companies.  
 
 
Table 2. License regime indicators 
 Canada Greenland Norway Russia US 
Award 
method  
Bidding Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary Bidding 
Authorities/sc
ales involved 
2 1 2 2 3 
Pre-
qualification 
Yes but minimal Yes, quite demanding Yes, quite 
demanding 
Yes, very limiting Yes but minimal 
Nomination 
by companies 
Yes Yes APA: no, Frontier 
areas: yes 
Yes4 Yes 
Frequency of 
issuance and 
regularity 
On demand On demand APA: annual, 
Frontier areas: every 
second year 
At discretion of 
the Gov-t 
5 year plans; sales 
frequency under 
discretion of DOI 
                                                 
4 In the Russian system, companies do not nominate blocs as there are no license round calls for Arctic 
waters. But qualified companies can de facto apply for licenses by lodging specified documents to 
Rosnedra [79]. 
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Duration, 
extension and 
adjustment 
EL: 9 years, SDL: as 
long as declaration 
is valid, PL: 25 
years. EL 
extendable if drilling 
started. PL 
extendable if 
petroleum is being 
commercially 
produced. 
Prospecting license: 5 
years. Exploration and 
exploitation: 10 or 16 
years, extensions 3 years 
at a time. For production, 
license extended for 30 
years for areas with 
deposits. Discretion of 
the Gov-t for further 
extensions, but total 
period up to 50 years 
EL: 3 years, PL: 10 
years, extension to 
50 years and beyond 
possible 
EL: 10 years, PL: 
as long as 
required to 
complete the 
development 
Initially 5 years, 
extension to 10 
years possible; 
production: as 
long as covers 
costs of well 
operations; 
request for 
suspension 
possible 
Fees Forfeitures, rentals, 
fees, may be waived 
License and area fees, 
may be waived 
Various but many 
may be waived 
One-off and 
regular payments 
Up-front and 
performance 
payments, rental 
payments and 
other financial 
commitments 
Duties under 
the license 
May apply May apply Apply but may be 
waived 
Agreed volumes, 
standard 
obligations 
May apply 
Exclusivity of 
licenses 
EL: exclusive rights 
only to drill; PL: 
exclusive; SDL: 
exclusive rights to 
apply for PL 
Prospecting: non-
exclusive; Exploration 
and exploitation: 
exclusive 
EL: non-exclusive; 
PL: exclusive 
Exclusive, but 
where non-
invasive 
prospecting, other 
companies may be 
granted similar 
rights in the area 
Exclusive 
Regime for 
access 
Most lenient Rather lenient Rather lenient Most strict Rather strict 
Regime for 
operation 
Most lenient Most lenient Most strict Rather lenient Rather lenient 
 
To test the hypothesis on whether a more lenient licensing regime results in more 
petroleum activity in offshore Arctic areas, this paper now turns to the figures on the 
current rates of activities. If the hypothesis were confirmed, States with most 
activities would include Canada and Greenland, while less activity would be observed 
in Norway and Russia. Table 3 below outlines the number of active petroleum 
licences for Arctic offshore areas, number of currently producing fields, and the rate 
of exploration activities.  
 
Table 3. Numbers of active ELs and PLs 
 Canada Greenland Norway Russia US 
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Number of 
active 
licenses 
As of end 2016, 15 
ELs in the Canadian 
Arctic offshore, all 
Beaufort Sea; no PLs 
in Canadian Arctic 
waters; 69 SDLs in 
the Beaufort Sea, 
Arctic Islands of 
Nunavut, and Eastern 
Arctic Offshore [45] 
 
As of January 2018, 9 
non-exclusive 
prospective licenses; 
11 exploration and 
exploitation licenses (2 
expire in May 2018) 
[106] 
As of April 2018, 
60 licenses in the 
Barents Sea, 8 of 
which awarded in 
the 2017 APA; 
exploration 
acreage in Barents 
Sea expanding 
[67, 110, 116] 
As of January 
2017, 28 
combined licenses 
for Rosneft’; as of 
2016, 21 for 
Gazprom [107; 
108] 
As of April 
2018, 54 active 
licenses (35 of 
which have 
operations 
suspended) [40] 
 
Number of 
producing 
fields 
0 0 2 - Gas field 
Snøhvit and oil 
field Gøliat 
1 – Oil field 
Prirazlomnaya 
05 
Number of 
exploration 
wells 
drilled/fields 
explored 
142 since 1970 (92 in 
Beaufort Sea); last 
wells drilled 2005, 
although regular 
drilling activity 
finished in 1989 
[109] 
15 since the 
commencement of 
drilling activity in 
1975, no commercial 
deposits [28] 
Exploration 
drilling on 5 
licenses in 2017; 
one well drilled in 
2018 [111, 112]; 
11 discoveries in 
the Barents Sea, in 
6 production 
deemed likely 
[105] 
Rosneft’: 2 
commercial 
discoveries 
announced in the 
past 4 years. 
[107]. Gazprom – 
data n/a for Arctic 
projects 
separately [117]. 
 
2 wells in the 
past 3 years (1 
in Beaufort Sea, 
1 in Chukchi 
Sea) [113; 114]. 
Notes Moratorium No applications in the 
latest round, 
relinquishment of 
licenses in recent years 
[115] 
 Sanctions Moratorium, 
but overturned 
Table 3 shows that the State with the most active petroleum development in the Arctic 
offshore is Norway with two producing fields and a growing number of exploration 
activities. The most recent APA 2017 licensing round marks the largest expansion of 
exploration acreage yet in the Barents Sea with 53 included blocs [67]. In early 2018, 
the government announced plans to extend the APA area by another 56 blocs in the 
Barents Sea [39]. The 24th ordinary licensing round for frontier areas, announced in 
June 2017, included 93 blocks in the Barents Sea. During the 23rd licensing round in 
2016, for the first time since 1994 a new area for production was opened up, namely 
in the south-eastern Barents Sea [69]. For APA 2017, a record number of 39 
                                                 
5 There are, however, fields producing within the Alaska OCS using artificial islands. One is the 
Northstar in the Beaufort Sea (in production since 2001). The final Environmental Impact Statement 
for another such field, Liberty, has been approved by the BOEM in August 2018.  
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companies sent applications; 75 PLs were awarded, 8 of which in the Barents Sea 
[110].  
Russia is second most active. Although not a lot of data is available on the current rate 
or exploratory drilling, there is a producing oil field and a good number of active 
petroleum licenses. The US ranks third with a tendency for license relinquishment and 
no producing fields. The same holds for Canada but is augmented by the moratorium 
on new ELs in Arctic waters. The country with the least activity is Greenland with 
lower industry interest and rather low exploration activities. 
This data suggests that there is very little correlation between the stringency of the 
licensing regime and the rate of offshore petroleum activity in the Arctic. Norway 
shows rather strict criteria on many factors analysed, and even shows the strictest 
regime in terms of license operations, but is most active in Arctic offshore petroleum 
development. In contrast, Greenland has been found to be most lenient on license 
operations but shows the lowest rate of activities. Equally, Canada has overall a very 
lenient licensing regime but very little exploration and no production activity. The 
strict license access in Russia does not correspond with comparatively high petroleum 
activities. Only the US could fit the hypothesis with a mix of strict and lenient 
licensing regime factors corresponding with medium level of industry activity. 
Overall, the rates of petroleum activities in Arctic waters are generally low, despite 
predictions of a ‘race for Arctic riches’ [37; 38]. 
While the stringency of the licensing regime is not the decisive factor for industry 
interest and petroleum activities in Arctic waters, there are a number of other factors 
that might provide a better explanation. Although a detailed analysis of these factors 
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is outwith the scope of this paper, they are briefly outlined below with references to 
further studies. 
 
6. Additional Factors  
6.1 Companies’ testimonies 
To elucidate on the potential factors of companies disinterest in Arctic offshore 
petroleum licenses, a survey of the relevant companies’ testimonies was conducted 
from the statements provided on their websites or given to the media. While the 
companies do not comment on every decision to (not) participate in licensing 
processes, they usually provide more details when they withdraw from existing 
licenses. We considered 11 cases of withdrawal from licenses in the US, Canada, and 
Greenland. Only in one case, concerning Greenland, was the high price of 
maintaining licenses quoted as part of the reason for withdrawal [100]. In another 
case, in Canada, unfavourable license terms were cited as the primary reason for 
withdrawal.6 In all other cases the reasons for withdrawal were associated with other 
factors, such as disappointing drilling results (Shell, Alaska, 2015) (Statoil, GDF 
Suez, Greenland, 2015 7) (Statoil, Alaska , 20158), high costs of operation (Shell, 
                                                 
6 Imperial Oil and BP said ‘under the current licence term, there is insufficient time to conduct the 
necessary technical work and complete the regulatory process.’ They reiterated that the price of oil did 
not play a role in the decision [99].  
7 Statoil gave back three of their four licences in Greenland as they ‘saw no further potential’. GDF 
Suez said it did not see any prospects of actually drilling any wells. Cairn Energy has been the biggest 
explorer in Greenland but yielded no commercial finds [98].  
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Alaska, 2015), ‘challenging and unpredictable federal regulatory environment’ (Shell, 
Alaska, 2015),9 establishment of a marine conservation area (Shell, Baffin Bay, 2016 
[45, 76]), and lack of economic stability in the industry (Chevron, Canada, 2014 [70]). 
In Russia, a number of companies expressed dissatisfaction with the current licensing 
regime and are eager to participate if the access to licenses is open to private and/or 
foreign companies [68]. Another important factor for the lack of activities is the 
ongoing sanctions from the European Union and the US [56; 42]. In February 2018, 
ExxonMobil confirmed that it is pulling out of its Arctic cooperation with Rosneft’ in 
the Kara Sea because of the sanctions [57]. 
 
6.2 Regulatory requirements other than licensing 
Obtaining a license is only the first step in developing petroleum resources. The 
regulatory frameworks associated with obtaining drilling permits, health and safety, 
and taxation regimes arguably take up a lot of companies’ legal and financial 
resources. Adhering to these rules is essential to perform work commitments under 
the license and to ensure that licenses are not revoked due to violations.  
Some Arctic States have developed specific rules for operations in Arctic waters [43; 
58]. Moreover, usually acceptable operation requirements can become a hurdle in the 
                                                                                                                                           
8 Statoil exited 16 Statoil-operated leases, and its stake in 50 leases operated by ConocoPhillips, all in 
the Chukchi Sea, mainly because of ‘the results of the prospecting in the neighbouring bloc conducted 
by Shell’ [77]. 
9 Given that no fundamental changes in the licensing regime were observed at the time, but rather a 
new regulation on the exploratory drilling rules was adopted, the licensing regime was unlikely to have 
caused Shell’s decision [114]. 
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Arctic due to remote locations and short drilling seasons. Despite arguably favourable 
licensing conditions in the Canadian Arctic, the requirement for a same season relief 
well has been quoted as one of the main reasons making deeper exploration ‘not 
feasible’ [63]. In the US, Shell quoted an unpredictable legislative framework as a 
reason for withdrawal in September 2015 [114]. Current developments in the 
Norwegian offshore petroleum tax regime might lead to divestment movements on the 
Norwegian continental shelf [44]. Conversely, tax incentives for offshore production 
in Russia are quoted by companies to have sparked increasing interest by foreign 
companies to enter into Strategic Cooperation Agreements with Russian companies 
for offshore exploration. 
 
6.3 Location and infrastructure 
More activity in Norway could be explained by its milder climate and more developed 
petroleum infrastructure compared to the US and Canadian Arctic. Further, the 
possibilities of transportation of oil and gas are not equal across the Arctic. Large-
scale development requires pipelines infrastructure and/or ports large enough to 
accommodate tankers. In the case of gas, either access to pipelines or liquefied natural 
gas infrastructure is required. These concerns might be an important factor in the 
petroleum companies’ decision-making on investment in the Arctic offshore. 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Energy law literature sheds some light on the balance between energy development, 
environmental and climate concerns, and considerations of energy security [118-120]. 
Building on the existing literature analysing the Arctic petroleum regimes [28, 30, 32, 
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34] and the role of licensing in energy development [12, 41], this paper explored if 
there is a connection between the level of offshore petroleum activities in the five 
Arctic coastal States and their respective licensing regime. Very little correlation 
could be found between licensing regime type and petroleum activity, highlighting the 
role of other factors in determining the pace and extent of offshore petroleum 
exploration and production in the Arctic. The additional factors outlined above 
provide ample food for thought and further investigation as well as for other, thus far 
not considered determinants in the academic debate. 
The comparative analysis of the five Arctic coastal States’ licensing regimes found 
that all systems are relatively lenient, especially when it comes to operation activities 
in the Arctic offshore. This mirrors the States’ interest in revenues from offshore oil 
and gas development, which stems mostly from tax on oil and gas production and the 
resulting profits.  
This paper has further shown that the legal, political, and economic conditions for 
offshore petroleum activities are very different across Arctic countries, warranting 
further research efforts on country-specific circumstances in relation to Arctic 
offshore oil and gas. Some efforts are discernible in this regard, for example in 
explaining the relatively high foreign industry interest in getting involved in 
cooperation agreements on the Russian continental shelf to rather unfavourable 
license and production conditions [36, p. 279-299.].  
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